This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payos can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Introduction
Game theory models rational agents as selsh players who take actions independently of each other. In reality, players' decisions often depend on correlated external events (sunspots) and players may exchange messages before taking decisions. The correlation of actions was formalized in the seminal work of Aumann (1974) who showed that correlated actions may achieve (Pareto-)better outcomes. Aumann's correlated equilibrium requires a centralized replace the mediator by a cheap-talk phase that takes place before the game starts. As a consequence, communication equilibria are implementable by cheap-talk procedures. The cheap-talk mechanisms we use have two alternative forms. In the rst form, the players perform a long cheap-talk phase before the game starts, thereby exchanging many private messages. During the play, short cheap-talk phases are performed whereby each player sends a single public message. In the second form, the players perform cheap-talk phases before the game starts and at every stage along the play. The length of each cheap-talk phase is random, but the expected number of messages sent at each phase is nite.
We now discuss the main ingredients of the proofs of these results. To prove Theorem 9, we rst strengthen the result of Solan (2001) and show that in games with public information, communication ε-equilibria are equivalent to extensive form correlated ε-equilibria. I.e., it is not essential to assume that the mediator receives messages from the players or observes the actual history of the game. Thanks to the revelation principle (see Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986) ), any communication equilibrium can be implemented by a device which observes the history and sends recommendations that are obediently followed by the players.
If the mediator does not observe the history nor receives messages, it is enough to let it send lists of history-dependent recommendations, and to let players coordinate on the messages relevant to the actual history. Second, we let the mediator act only at the pre-play stage.
We use authentication schemesà la Rabin and Ben-Or (1989) to let the device send to each player encrypted recommended actions for the whole game. The encoding keys are told to another player. At each stage of the game, players simultaneously broadcast the encoding keys. The authentication properties of the schemes of Rabin and Ben-Or enable all players to know whether a broadcasted key is genuine or not.
To prove Theorem 10, we rely on the secure multiparty computation protocols of Rabin and Ben-Or (1989), and of Ben-Or et al. (1988) . These cheap-talk protocols allow players to jointly compute outputs which are polynomial functions of the prole of private inputs of players. The computation is secure in that player i learns his own output without getting any information on the inputs and outputs of the other players. These protocols have been used for cheap-talk implementation of correlated equilibria in one-stage games in Abraham et al. (2006, 2008) and Heller (2010a) . The novelty of the present paper is the adaptation of these protocols for the implementation of communication equilibria in multi-stage games.
Stochastic games are a special kind of games with public information, where the players perfectly observe the state variable and the action prole. Vieille (2000a Vieille ( , 2000b proved that any two-player undiscounted stochastic game (with a nite number of states) admits an equilibrium payo (without any communication). Whether this holds true for stochastic games with more than two players is an open problem. Solan and Vieille (2002) proved that any undiscounted n-player stochastic game (with a nite number of states) admits an extensive-form correlated equilibrium. Our results yield the following corollary: Every undiscounted n-player stochastic game (with a nite number of states) admits a cheap-talk equilibrium payo, i.e., a communication equilibrium payo that involves only cheap-talk, with one of the two cheap-talk mechanisms described above.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the results are described in Section 2. The proof of the rst main result is given in Section 3, and the proof of the second main result is given in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
Model

Games with Public information
We study a class of extensive form games, henceforth called games with public information, where there is a timing structure, and at each point of time, all players have the same information about the past history of the game. These are multi-stage games, where at each stage, the moves of each player and of chance are publicly disclosed.
1 The game played at each stage can be history dependent. This class of games has been described in the literature as extensive games with perfect information and simultaneous moves (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, page 102, based on Dubey and Kaneko, 1984), or as multi-stage games (see Forges, 1986 ). Let us dene such games formally, following Osborne and Rubinstein.
A game with public information is a tuple G = I, H, P, A, f, (u i ) where:
• I is a nite set of players.
• H is a set of sequences, nite or innite, called histories. A history is denoted h = (a k ) k=1,...,K where K ∈ N ∪ {+∞} is the length of h. The following three properties are assumed:
The empty sequence ∅ is a member of H. A prex of a history is a history:
If all prexes of an innite sequence (a k ) ∞ k=1 are histories, then so is the innite sequence.
The set of terminal histories is denoted Z.
1 All of our results hold if players have symmetric partial information about chance moves.
• P is a mapping that assigns to each nonterminal history h the set of players P (h) ⊆ I that have to take an action after history h. If P (h) = ∅ then there is a chance move after history h.
• A is a mapping that assigns to every nonterminal history h such that P (h) = ∅, and to every player i ∈ P (h), a nite set A i (h) of actions available to player i after that history.
Let A (h) be the set of available action-proles at h:
is the nite set of chance moves at the history h.
The set of histories H, and the function A satisfy the following property. For every nonterminal history h: a ∈ A (h) ⇔(h, a) ∈ H. That is, a history h = (a k ) k=1,...,K is a sequence of action proles where the components of a k are the actions taken by players i ∈ P (a l )
or by chance (if P (a l )
• f is a mapping that assigns to every nonterminal history h such that P (h) = ∅, a probability distribution f (·|h) over chance moves A (h). That is, when chance has to move after a nonterminal history h, an action a ∈ A (h) is chosen according to the probability distribution f (· | h).
is the payo function of player i dened over terminal histories. This function is assumed to be measurable with respect to the product σ-algebra on H; the σ-algebra over each nite set A (h) is the discrete σ-algebra.
The game unfolds as follows. The empty history is the starting point of the game. Players in P (∅) choose actions simultaneously (if P (∅) = ∅, then chance chooses an action according to the distribution f (· | ∅)). Given the chosen action prole a, players in P (a) choose actions at the next stage and so on until a terminal history z is reached (recall that histories can be innite and that an innite history is terminal). Each player i ∈ I receives the payo u i (z).
Games with public information encompass extensive form games without information sets, repeated games with perfect monitoring of actions where all players move at each stage, and more generally, stochastic games with perfect monitoring of state and actions, where the current game depends on a parameter that evolves according to the moves of the players and of chance. In fact, any game with public information can be represented as a stochastic game, where H is the state space and the law of motion is the one described above by the data of P and f .
Communication and correlated equilibria
Since the seminal work of Aumann (1974) on correlated equilibria, various solution concepts extending Nash equilibria have been proposed to account for possibilities of costless communication between the players. We present now the main solution concepts, following Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986) .
A communication device is an agent that exchanges messages with the players between game stages. This models a trustworthy mediator, which helps the players communicate and correlate their actions. It species spaces of messages that the device sends to the players, spaces of messages that the device receives from the players, and the rule according to which the device sends messages.
Formally, let G be a game with public information. A communication device is a tuple , and r = (r k ) K k=1 are feasible histories of messages, i.e., for each n < K, s n+1 ∈ S(h n ) := × i∈I S i (h n ), and r n+1 ∈ R(h n ) := × i∈I R i (h n ), with h n := (a k ) k≤n .
• µ is a transition probability that maps extended histories to probability distributions over signals sent to the players: µ(·|h, s, r) ∈ (S (h)) is a probability distribution over S(h).
Given a communication device D, the game extended by D, noted G(D), unfolds as follows.
After each extended history (h, s, r) = (a k )
(1) The device chooses a prole of signals 
) and receives the new signal s i K+1 . Then
) is the probability distribution over A i (h) used by player i for choosing his new action (whenever i ∈ P (h)). After actions have been chosen, player i has observed
) and chooses a new message r i k+1 according to a distribution over
We denote by γ i D (y) = E y (u i (z)) the expected payo of player i with respect to the probability distribution induced by the correlation device D and the strategy prole y over terminal histories. For ε ≥ 0, a strategy prole y is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the extended game G (D) if for every player i ∈ I and every strategyŷ i of player i: 
a singleton otherwise.
• A communication device is autonomous if the mediator does not receive inputs from the players (R i (h) is a singleton) and does not observe the history of the game (S i (h) and µ(·|h, r, s) depend on h only through its length K).
• 
induced by an autonomous (pre-play correlation) device.
Remark 4 A revelation principle applies to communication equilibria (see Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986) . That is, any communication ε-equilibrium is equivalent to a canonical communication ε-equilibrium where the device recommends actions to the players, at equilibrium each player actually plays the recommended action, and then players faithfully report their incremental information to the device. Here, the reports of the players consist in announcing the newly played action prole, which is superuous since the device observes the history. It is thus without loss of generality to assume that the players do not send messages.
This discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let G be a game with public information. For every ε ≥ 0, every communication ε-equilibrium is equivalent to: (1) a canonical communication ε-equilibrium, and (2) an extensive form correlated ε-equilibrium.
A similar result is proved in Solan (2001) , who shows that for games with public information and general action spaces, communication and extensive form correlated equilibrium payos coincide. Proposition 5 is slightly stronger: every communication ε-equilibrium can be exactly replicated by an autonomous (or canonical) device. The rst part of the proposition directly follows from the revelation principle. The proof of the second part of the proposition is a building block of the proof of Theorem 9, and is given in Section 3 for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 5 is specic to games with public information. For instance, in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring of actions, communication and extensive form correlated equilibria are not equivalent (see Renault and Tomala, 2004) . It is known, however, that pre-play correlated equilibria are not equivalent to extensive form correlated equilibria, even in games with public information, see Forges, 1986. 
Cheap-Talk
Cheap-talk is a particular form of communication where players can freely and costlessly exchange messages without any mediation.
2 In our cheap-talk model, we assume that each player is able to send a private message to any other player (and no other player can intercept this message), and that each player is able to broadcast public announcements.
3 In addition we assume that the identity of the sender of each message is certiable.
Denition 6 • A cheap-talk phase species a nite message space M containing a null message ♦, and consists of (possibly innitely many) rounds of communication. In each round n, each player i can send simultaneous private and public messages (i.e. send a private message to each player j and/or broadcast a message).
• A cheap-talk extension G * of a game with perfect information G is a game in extensive form where, after each non-terminal history h, a cheap-talk phase is played with a history dependent message space M (h).
• A cheap-talk ε-equilibrium payo of G is an ε-equilibrium payo of a cheap-talk extension
A cheap-talk equilibrium payo is the limit of ε-equilibrium payos as ε > 0 goes to 0.
Cheap-talk extensions are particular kinds of communication devices, and consequently a cheap-talk ε-equilibrium is a communication ε-equilibrium. Though a cheap-talk phase can have innitely many rounds, in most of our constructions, the number of communication rounds is either nite, or has nite expectation. Denote by s i,j k,n (resp. s i,I k,n ) the private (resp. public) message that player i sends to player j (resp. broadcasts) at the n-th round of the k-th cheap-talk phase. An i-information set in a cheap-talk extension after the N -th round of the
is the history of messages that player i sent or received in past cheap-talk phases (1, . . . , K), and in the current phase (K +1) until round N (N may be nite or innite). That is, for
is the sequence of messages player i sent or received in the k'th cheap-talk phase, and
is the sequence of messages that player i sent or received in the rst N rounds of the K + 1'th cheap-talk phase. A behavior strategy of player i in G * is denoted by
2 See Farrel and Rabin (1996) for a nontechnical introduction to some of the main issues of cheaptalk. An extended history in a cheap-talk extension after the N -th round of the K-th cheap-talk phase is a prole of i-information sets for each player: (h, s, N ) = (h, s i , N ) i∈I . Let y be a strategy prole in G * and (h, s) := (h, s, 0) an extended history at the beginning of the cheap-talk phase that follows history h. The length of the cheap-talk phase that follows (h, s)
is a random variable denoted l y (h, s). That is, l y (h, s) is the minimal n 0 , such that for each round n ≥ n 0 , all messages that are sent by the players are equal to ♦. If there exists no such n 0 , l y (h, s) = ∞. 
An important feature of our work is the implementation of communication by pre-play correlation and short cheap-talk phases. We thus examine extensions of the game where after the rst stage, players only make public announcements.
Denition 8 An almost-pre-play cheap-talk ε-equilibrium of G is an ε-equilibrium y of the game extended by cheap-talk such that at all cheap-talk phases, except at the rst one, each player sends a single public message. That is : (1) the length of each cheap-talk phase is 1: ∀h = ∅, l y (h, s) ≤ 1, and (2) all private message are null:
An almost-pre-play correlated ε-equilibrium of G is an ε-equilibrium of the game extended by a pre-play correlation device and by cheap-talk such that only public messages are sent:
The main results
Our rst result shows that in games with public information, a communication equilibrium payo, or equivalently, an extensive form correlated equilibrium payo, is an almost preplay correlated equilibrium payo. That is, the device may act only before the beginning of the game, provided that players can make cheap-talk public announcements throughout the game.
Theorem 9 Let G be a game with public information, and g ∈ R I a communication equilibrium payo. Then g is an almost-pre-play correlated equilibrium payo.
The formal proof in Section 3. The intuition is as follows. The device draws all recommendations for all possible histories. Each recommendation is then encrypted using an encoding key. Player i is told the encrypted recommendations for himself, while the encoding keys (one key for each recommendation) is told to another player j. At the relevant stage, player j announces the encoding key so as to allow player i to learn the recommendation. To prevent player j announcing a false value of the key, the device authenticates the key in such a way that player i is able to tell whether the key is genuine or forged. This is done using the authentication schemes of Rabin and Ben-Or (1989), called check vectors therein.
Our second result shows that with more than two players, the mediator can be fully dispensed with. We show that, if there are at least three players, any communication equilibrium payo is an almost-pre-play cheap-talk equilibrium payo and a nite-in-expectation cheap-talk equilibrium payo. Finally, if there are at least four players, it can be obtained as a nite cheap-talk equilibrium payo.
Theorem 10 Let G be a game with public information with three or more players, and Corollary 12 Every undiscounted n-player stochastic game (with a nite number of states) admits a nite cheap-talk equilibrium payo, an almost-pre-play cheap-talk equilibrium payo, and an almost-pre-play correlated equilibrium payo. The main contribution of the present paper is the cheap-talk implementation of communication equilibria of extensive games with public information (nite and innite). 4 3 Proof of Theorem 9
Let G be a game with public information. From the revelation principle, we may assume without loss of generality that: (1) the device observes the history of the game and recommends actions to the players, and (2) players obediently play the recommended actions and do not send any messages. Let us x a canonical communication device D such that the obedient prole is an ε-equilibrium of the extended game, and let g be the corresponding payo. The canonical communication ε-equilibrium is given by a transition probability µ(·) from extended histories to recommended actions. For any pair (h, s), where h is a non-terminal history of the game and s is a history of recommendations, µ(h, s) is a probability distribution over A(h).
We begin by proving the second part of Proposition 5. We dene rst an autonomous device D * (which does not observe the actual history) equivalent to D. We denote by H K the set of histories of length K (H 0 = {∅}).
Step A. In a pre-play phase, D * does the following:
•
The construction implicitly stops when a terminal history is reached.
Step B. At the beginning of each stage K + 1, the device informs player i of {s
To construct an almost pre-play correlated equilibrium, we need to modify the device D * , so that the modied device sends messages only before the start of the game. First, minimax punishments are needed in case a deviation is detected. For each player i and history h, dene . In the sequel, A i (h) is treated as a subset of Z p h , the nite eld of integers modulo p h . We also x for each player i a player j(i) = i. For each history h and each player i ∈ P (h), the device does the following:
• The device draws three random variables (x • Player i is informed of (y
The random draws are all done at the pre-play stage and independently across players and histories. The device then sends all these random messages to the respective players. Let us now describe the strategies of the players. After each history h (where P (h) = ∅):
• All the players in {j (i) : i ∈ P (h)} simultaneously broadcast the pairs (x is repeated for the next historyĥ = (h, (ŝ i (h)) i∈I ).
• If a single player j does not pass a test, he is minimaxed for the remainder of the game,
i.e other players play y −j * (j, h).
• If several players do not pass their test, the players play arbitrarily until the end of the game.
We have thus dened a pre-play correlation device and strategies in the game with cheap-talk one-shot public announcements. Note that the induced payo is g. Indeed, if all players use these strategies, thenŝ 1/p h . The probability to pass the test with a false report is thus at most 1/p h .
Such a deviation of player j(i)
is detected by all players with high probability. It yields player j(i) an expected payo no greater than (1 − 1/p h )v in the set {1, ..., L} (for large enough L), and in the pre-play phase it sends: 1) the sequence (a 1 , ..., a K ) to player i; 2) the number a k to player j(i); and 3) a permutation of the sequence (a 1 , ..., a K ) in a random order to all other players. At the mid-play talk phase after history h, player j(i) broadcasts the number a k that he received. Assuming that player j(i) followed the protocol, then player i knows his recommended action, while all other players only know that player j(i) broadcasted a valid recommended action. If player j(i) lies (broadcasts any other number), then the deviation is detected by all other players with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 10
The main building block of our cheap-talk implementations is the secure multiparty compu- The rst subsection describes the main properties of the protocols, and in the following subsections we apply these protocols to prove the two points of Theorem 10.
5 We uses Rabin and Ben-Or's authentication scheme in order to make the proof of Theorem 9 more similar to the proof of Theorem 10, which extensively uses schemes of Rabin and Ben-Or (1989).
Secure Multiparty Computations
The main tool for proving Theorem 10 are the protocols of BGW and RB. The protocols of BGW and RB deal with |I| players, out of which up to t players (t < |I| /2) may jointly deviate from the protocol. We assume t = 1 and |I| ≥ 3, i.e., only unilateral deviations are possible and there are at least 3 players. The reader is referred to BGW and RB for a complete denitions of the protocols. Let us now recall the properties of these protocols that are useful to us.
Both protocols share the following secrecy property: a unilateral deviation does not allow the deviator to acquire any information about the inputs or the outputs of the other players. 6
We now describe reliability properties of these protocols, namely the correction property of BGW's protocol (with four or more players), and the weaker monitoring property of RB's protocol. The concern is that outcomes should not be aected too much by unilateral deviations. Second, assume there are three players. Say that the protocol has the monitoring property if it is followed by a monitoring subphase such that (1) and (2) below are satised:
(1) If only player i deviates during the multiparty computation, then all non-deviating players commonly agree that player i deviated.
(2) If no player deviates during the multiparty computation, then at the end of the monitoring subphase, all non-deviating players commonly agree: (i) that no deviation occurred, and (ii) on the values of the inputs and outputs of all the players.
RB constructs a protocol that has the monitoring property with high probability. That is, for each δ > 0 there exists a protocol such that for every unilateral deviation, the requirements (1) and (2) hold with probability at least 1 − δ. Further, if no player deviates, then (2) occurs with probability 1.
Finite Cheap-Talk Implementation
In this subsection we prove the rst point of Theorem 10.
PROOF. We x a canonical communication device D such that the obedient prole is an ε-equilibrium of the extended game. Let µ (·) be the corresponding transition probability from extended histories to recommended actions, and g be the corresponding payo. Let us construct a nite-in-expectation cheap-talk 3ε-equilibrium z that induces a payo g ε in an ε-neighborhood of g.
After histories h ∈ H where P (h) = ∅, no communication is executed (players send null messages).
For each extended history (h, s) where h ∈ H is a history of length K such that P (h) = ∅ and s is a history of recommendations, we construct a cheap-talk phase from which each active player i ∈ P (h) obtains a recommended action a i ∈ A i (h). The cheap-talk phase comprises three subphases: (1) monitoring of the previous stage, (2) choosing a prole by multiparty computation, (3) random monitoring (subphase (3) is needed only when there are three players). We describe how each of subphase is executed. In the following, we set
(1) Monitoring of the previous stage. Each player publicly broadcasts the messages that he sent and received during the last computation subphase of the previous cheap-talk phase.
Note that, due to the correction property (or the monitoring property when there are three players), all non-deviating players commonly agree (with probability at least 1 − δ(h) when there are three players) on the prole of recommended actions that where induced in the previous cheap-talk phase, even if one of the players deviates in this subphase. As a consequence, after the extended history (h, s), all non-deviating players agree on the value of s with probability at least 1 − ε 2 (with probability 1 if there are at least four players).
(2) Choosing a prole. If there is no coalition of at least |I| − 1 players that agree on the value of s, then players play arbitrarily in the remainder of the game.
Otherwise, they perform a multiparty computation protocol that draws (a i ) i∈P (h) from the distribution µ(h, s) and informs player i of a i only.
Note that the former case occurs with probability at most ε and only if there are three players and one of them is a deviator. In the latter case, the multiparty computation protocol is as follows.
We assume that all action sets A i (h) are subsets of Z p and let M (h) = Z p ∪ {♦} be the set of messages.
7
Let (f i (·)) i∈I be a vector of polynomials over Z p , such that the distribution of (f i (x)) i∈I approximates µ (h, s) when x is uniformly distributed. Formally, the polynomials satisfy the following conditions:
• For each non-active player i / ∈ P (h),
Let each player i choose a uniformly distributed secret input x i ∈ Z p and let x = x 1 + · · · + x |I| . As soon as at least one player i chooses x i uniformly, then x is uniformly distributed, regardless of the way the other secrets (x j ) j∈I are chosen. The players then use the multiparty computation of BGW and RB for computing (f i (x)) i∈P (h) . At the end of this subphase, 7 Since actions sets are nite, we can map actions one-to-one to integers in {1, . . . , p}.
each player i obtains the value of his output f i (x), which is interpreted as the protocol's recommended action for player i: if f i (x) = a i , then player i should play a i . If some player i does not receive a valid recommended action, he chooses his action arbitrarily. 8
If a player receives an invalid message during the computation subphase (for example, receiving a null message instead of a number in Z p ), then he asks the sender to publicly broadcast the message. If the broadcasted message is invalid as well, then all non-deviating players commonly know the identity of the deviator and they minimax him for the rest of the game.
When there are four or more players, the correction property of BGW's protocol guarantees that unilateral deviations are corrected by the other players: a recommended action prole is generated according to the desired distribution, and each player correctly receives his recommended action. When there are three players we add a random monitoring subphase. 9
(3) Random monitoring. The players decide, according to a joint lottery, whether to perform a monitoring subphase or not. In the former case, each player broadcasts all messages he sent and received in the last computation subphase. In the latter case, nothing is revealed and the cheap-talk phase ends (every player sends null messages), and each player plays his recommended action. The monitoring property of RB's protocol guarantees that when the monitoring subphase is executed (regardless of any unilateral deviation during this subphase), with probability at least 1 − δ (h), all non-deviating players correctly agree on the identity of any single deviator in the computation subphase. Assuming that they all agree that player i deviated, then all the other players minimax player i for the rest of the game: they use cheap-talk communication to implement a correlated prole that minimizes player i's payo. This completes the description of the cheap-talk extension and of the strategies. Now we prove that we have dened a 3ε-equilibrium that induces a payo ε-close to g.
First, observe that if all players follow the strategies z, the distributions of actions are close to the one given by µ and thus the payo is in an ε-neighborhood of g. Note also that by construction, z is nite (if all players follow the protocol) when there are four or more players: after each history, the players execute the nite protocol of BGW once. When there are three players, z is nite-in-expectation: each subphase is nite (due to the niteness of RB's protocol), and the expected number of repetitions of these subphases (which are determined by the results of the joint lotteries in the random monitoring subphase) is 1/ε, so it is nite as well.
Second, we discuss unilateral deviations. There are ve types of deviations from the protocol:
(1) deviation while monitoring the previous phase, (2) deviation in the computation subphase, (3) deviation in the random monitoring subphase, (4) deviation at the playing stage, (5) giving information to other players. We show that none of these deviations (nor a combination of them) is protable to the deviator.
(1) Deviating at monitoring of the previous stage subphases. In these subphases, players are supposed to broadcast the messages they received and sent in the previous computation subphase. Following the extended history (h, s), player i might deviate and send dierent messages in this subphase. However, the monitoring/correction properties guarantee that the non-deviating players commonly agree on the value of s with probability at least 1 − δ (h) (with probability 1 when there are four players or more). Thus, at all stages of the game, regardless of unilateral deviations at these subphases, all nondeviating players know the correct recommended proles in previous stages of the game, with probability at least
Thus, with probability at least 1 − ε 2 , a deviation at these subphases is not protable.
With probability ε 2 , the deviation may not be detected, and the deviator may gain at most 1 (payos are between 0 and 1). Therefore, the total expected gain from these deviations is at most ε 2 .
(2) Deviating at computation subphases.
• Public deviations -During the computation subphase, player i may broadcast an invalid message, e.g. by sending a null message instead of a number in Z p . In this case, all other players detect the deviation and minmax player i. Being minmaxed may increase player i's payo by at most ε relative to g, and thus by at most 2ε relative to the payo induced by z.
• Private deviations -Consider rst the three player case. A player may send an incorrect message, while the recipient of the message does not know that the message is incorrect. This may yield a prot of at most 1 if, at the random monitoring step, the result of the joint lottery is such that the players do not execute the monitoring subphase. However, the random monitoring is executed with probability at least 1 − ε, and the monitoring property of the protocol guarantees that the identity of the deviator is revealed to all non-deviating players with probability at least 1 − ε 2 . In this latter case, the other players minmax the deviator for the rest of the game, and he may increase his payo by at most 2ε. The expected gain from such a deviation is thus at most 3ε.
When there are at least four players, the correction property implies that there are no such undetected deviations: the recipient can always know whether a message is incorrect (that is, not induced by one of the protocol's obedient strategies), ask the recipient to broadcast it, and continue the computation with the broadcasted message (if it is also invalid, it is treated as a public deviation).
(3) Deviating in the random monitoring subphase. We only need to consider the three player case here. Player i may deviate at the joint lottery step, but such a deviation does not change the distribution of the lottery's result. He may also deviate in the random monitoring subphase itself. The monitoring property ensure that with probability at least 1 − δ (h), unilateral deviations at this stage do not aect players' assessments on deviations in the last computation subphase, and thus do not aect player i's payo. Thus, player i gains by deviating in a random monitoring subphase, with probability at most δ (h). As the expected number of random monitorings at each stage is 1/ε, player i gets an expected gain of at most εδ (h) = ε/2 K+1 , by deviating at all random monitoring subphases after a history of length K. Thus, deviating in all the random monitoring subphases throughout the game may increase the deviator's payo by at most ε. (4) Deviating in the playing stage. Player i may play an action dierent from the recommended. The monitoring/correction properties imply that the other players will know the prole of past recommendations with probability at least 1 − δ (h). Together with the fact that following the device's recommendations is an ε-equilibrium of the extended game G (D), this implies that player i may increase his payo by at most 2ε + ε 2 by the deviation.
(5) Giving information to other players: Player i may deviate by sending another player (say player j) some information acquired during the computation phase, thereby allowing player j to obtain information about the recommended action prole, and have a protable deviation (which may be also protable to player i). Since only unilateral deviations are possible, player i should expect player j to conform with the strategies and thus disregard the extra information. When player i deviates, we are o equilibrium (we have not required any perfection properties) and thus we assume that no other player j deviates afterwards.
From this discussion, we conclude that no unilateral deviation may increase the payo of the deviator by more than 3ε.
Almost-Pre-Play Cheap-Talk Implementation
In this subsection we prove the second point of Theorem 10.
PROOF. We show how to adapt the construction of the previous section to yield an almostpre-play cheap-talk 3ε-equilibrium z that induces a payo in an ε-neighborhood of g. We use the same notation as in the previous proof complemented by the following: Given a history h ∈ H of length K, let S (h) be the set of histories of recommendations which are consistent with h. That is, (s i k ) k=1,...,K,i∈P (h|k) ∈ S (h) if and only if ∀k = 1, . . . , K, s
For each history h ∈ H and s ∈ S (h), let L (h, s) ∈ N be a large enough integer such that if L (h, s) many proles are sampled according to µ (h, s), then with probability at least
We describe now a long pre-play cheap-talk phase, and a short public mid-play cheap-talk phases.
Pre-play communication. During the rst cheap-talk phase, the players perform multiparty computation many times, to choose a large number of recommended action proles for each possible history and each sequence of past recommended proles. Specically, for each extended history (h, s) where h ∈ H and s ∈ S (h), players execute L (h, s) many times the following sub-phases: choosing a prole by multiparty computation and random monitoring.
(As before, the random monitoring is executed only when there are exactly three players. prole of the previous cheap-talk phase with probability at least 1 − δ (h). Thus with high probability, they commonly know s, and each player plays his j (h, s)-th recommended action for (h, s).
The same arguments as in the previous subsection imply that z is an almost-pre-play cheaptalk 3ε-equilibrium that induces a payo εclose to g.
Note that it is also possible to have an almost-pre-play cheap-talk implementation by an alternative construction, 13 where a single recommendation prole is constructed for each extended history (instead of L (h) proles), and the players use an authentication scheme as in Section 3. Pre-play communication in this alternative construction is shorter, because players have to construct a smaller number of recommendation proles (while the additional communication that is required to construct the authentication schemes is relatively short).
11
The players commonly know all the recommended proles except the last one.
12 As the computation subphase is nite and bounded, players can simultaneously broadcast all these messages using a large enough nite alphabet.
13
We have chosen not to use this alternative construction, due to the relative complexity of its formal presentation.
5 Concluding Remarks (1) Resistance to coalitional deviations: Abraham et al. (2006 Abraham et al. ( , 2008 implementing normal-form correlated equilibria of nite games in ways that are resistant to coalitional deviations. Specically, Heller denes a k-strong equilibrium, as a prole that is resistant to joint deviations of up to k players, and shows how to implement any k-strong normal-form correlated equilibrium as a k-strong Nash equilibrium of the extended cheap-talk game, assuming that the deviating coalition is a minority: k < |I| /2. The cheap-talk equilibria presented in this paper can be adapted to allow the implementation of canonical communication equilibria in games with public information in a way that is resistant to coalitional deviations of minorities.
(2) General action sets: Throughout the paper we assumed that at each stage of the game each player has a nite set of actions. We now shortly discuss the extensions of our results to the case where the set of actions is a compact subset of a separable metric space. Theorem 9 can be extended to this setup. Without loss of generality, the recommended action of each player i can be represented as a sequence of zeros and ones.
Each such bit can be encoded using the scheme described in Section 3 (where the players simultaneously send an innite number of messages at each mid-play cheap-talk phase).
Theorem 10 can be extended only under strong continuity assumptions on the whole structure of the game tree. With such assumptions, the action prole of the players at each stage can be approximated by a nite set, and the distributed computation schemes described in Section 4 can be used. In the general case, the distributed computation schemes, which relies on operations on a nite eld, cannot be used when the action sets are innite, and we do not know whether all communication equilibrium payos can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures.
